peace between states. Free trade, and not just trade, promotes peace by removing an important foundation of domestic privilege-protective barriers to trade-that enhances the domestic power of societal groups likely to support war, reduces the capacity of free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign po.'cy, and creates e mechanism by which the state can build supportive coalitions for war. A series of statistical tests supports these claims by showing that lower regulatory barriers to trade were associated with a reduction in military conflict between states during the postWorld War II era.
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. First, I outline the classical liberal roots and the contemporary literature that explores the hypothesis that free trade promotes peace. Second, I discuss how these insights find support in contemporary trade theory and neoinstitutional economics, both of which illustrate how societal and state interests for peace and war can be shaped by exposure to the global economy. Third, I present a series of statistical tests to support the link between protection and conflict. Finally, I conclude and discuss how these arguments suggest an important response to one of the standard criticisms of commercial liberalism, namely, that globalization failed to prevent the outbreak of World War I.
INTERDEPENDENCE AND PEACE:
MOVING BEYOND RICARDO An extensive base of empirical tests across a number of research designs-including differences in the operationalization of the independent and dependent variables, the temporal domain under study, and the unit of analysis-support the conclusion that international commerce promotes peace among states (e.g., Polachek 1980; Domke 1988; Mansfield 1994; Russett 1997, 1999 ; Russett and Oneal 2001; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; for an exception, see Barbieri 2002 ). The contemporary debate has traditionally relied on four variants of the broader hypothesis that trade promotes peace. The first has been labeled the opportunity cost or deterrence model. Because conflict or even the threat of it tends to disrupt normal trading patterns, potentially large economic costs will deter dependent states from using military force to solve their political conflicts (Polachek 1980) . A second mechanism that I call here the "efficiency argument" compares the relative costs of acquiring productive resources. As commerce grows, the incentives for plunder or conquest decrease simply because it is a more costly means of generating economic growth (Rosecrance 1986 ). Third, a sociological hypothesis concentrates on how trade helps to increase contact and communication across societies. By building a broader cosmopolitan identity across societies, trade displaces national loyalties and competitive relations between governments that generate military conflict (e.g., Deutsch et al. 1957 ). Fourth, drawing on bargaining models, some scholars argue that international commerce provides an important signaling mechanism that can help states achieve a negotiated compromise short of war during a crisis (e.g., Morrow 1999; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001).
Despite substantial empirical evidence for these hypotheses, scholars have challenged these claims for failing to elaborate a model of domestic politics that links commerce, societal interests in trade and peace, and the state with the creation of a pacific foreign policy (Stein 1993 (Moravcsik 1997) .
The neglect of domestic politics stems in part from a failure to incorporate important revisions to standard trade theory into the commercial peace debate (Schneider and Schulze 2003) . Most of the literature draws on Ricardo (1821/1973) and the principles of comparative advantage, which demonstrates that economies increase their aggregate consumption possibilities (or economic growth more generally) through specialization and trade. Accordingly, the standard hypotheses focus on these aggregate welfare benefits to explain any link between commerce and peace. For example, this claim helps motivate the opportunity cost hypothesis. Fearing the aggregate costs of economic disruption, societies will lobby the governments for a pacific foreign policy.
By concentrating on Ricardo's valuable insight, the literature overlooks how trade based on comparative advantage also creates societal coalitions opposed to further integration (e.g., Rogowski 1989 ). Both the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner frameworks demonstrate that economic integration redistributes income within a domestic society.2 Because some groups see their incomes decline from international trade, they are unlikely to support open markets. Such a conclusion casts doubt on the proposition that trading sectors in society will always win out among competing domestic interests and possess the political capacity to constrain an aggressive foreign policy.' Consequently, little research has been conducted on how these domestic distributional consequences of commerce may also shape the domestic politics of decisions for war and peace.4 Moreover, the process by which these trading interests translate preferences for maintaining an open economy into foreign policy outputs that include both an open trading system and a more pacific orientation in foreign policy must also account for the structure of domestic institutions that mediate societal conflict, aggregate these economic interests, and determine policy. The opportunity-cost hypothesis implicitly adopts a pluralist model of domestic politics that fails to acknowledge that the struc-2. The original studies of Heckscher and Ohlin and a review of their contributions to trade theory can be found in Flam and Flanders (1991 ) . On the Ricardo-Viner framework, see Jones (1971 ) and Samuelson (1971) .
3. Similarly, work on political or state-owned firms suggests that all enterprises do not respond to the profit motive that drives the opportunity cost hypothesis (Eggertsson 1990 ). Firms and societal groups are hypothesized to lobby the state for peace, fearing the adjustment costs following economic disruptions due to military conflict. If most domestic firms are publicly owned and possess alternative goals, such as maximizing employment, they may be less reactive to such price shocks and consequently less willing to pressure the state for peace.
4. In an important study examining how globalization played a central role in the origins of World War I, Rowe (1999) provides an exception to this by disaggregating societal interests with respect to trade and war according to relative factor endowments. ture of domestic institutions can privilege portions of society preferring a closed trading system and that the state possesses an independent capacity to arbitrate among and shape these interests. One strand of the interdependence literature has responded to this shortcoming by examining how democracy conditions the effects of commerce on conflict (Brawley 1993; Papayoanou 1999; Gelpi and Grieco 2003) . The ability of commerce to promote peace may be restricted to democratic states because the groups most hurt by interruptions in commerce can successfully lobby their governments in these polities for more peaceful foreign policies. Whereas regime type provides one means to characterize state-society interactions, it may not capture all of the variation across economies. Historically, import-competing sectors have been able to lobby and obtain protectionist legislation in democracies.5 This possibility suggests the need to explore the independent effects of protection on conflict.
THE SECOND-IMAGE DYNAMICS OF A COMMERCIAL PEACE
This section argues that a neglected fifth variant of the commercial liberalismmotivated by the writings of Cobden (1868, 1870), Schumpeter (1919 Schumpeter ( /1951 , and standard trade theory--offers important insights into how international commerce shapes the domestic politics of war. These classical scholars connect the domestic politics of international conflict with the domestic distributional consequence of commercial policy to explain how trade promotes peace. The elimination of protective commercial policies empowers societal groups most opposed to war and constrains the ability of governments to redistribute the costs of war onto groups outside its ruling coalition. Together, these twin pressures suggest that the adoption of free trade policies and not simply an increase in aggregate economic integration should bode well for peace.
Both Cobden (1868, 1870) and Schumpeter (1919 Schumpeter ( /1951 ) built these explanations from a broader liberal model of war, which holds that the external costs and benefits of waging war are inseparable from its domestic costs and benefits.6 Just as a state goes to war to extend its influence in the international system or eliminate a threat to its security, war simultaneously creates opportunities for a government to redistribute income toward its political supporters and solidify its domestic position. For example, Cobden (1868, 1,44-45; 1870, 2,429) argued that wars and "war scares" allowed governments to postpone domestic reforms that would necessarily expand individual liberty and 5. The United States stands out as an important example to this. Tariffs were the primary source of public revenues until World War I. For a discussion of the relationship between tariffs and taxes in the U.S. case, see fHansen (199tY).
6. Summarizing a liberal theory of war, Michael Howard (1978, 31) writes, By the end of the eighteenth century a complete liberal theory of international relations, of war and peace, had thus already developed.... According to this doctrine, mankind would naturally live in a state of perfect harmony if it were not for the vested interests of governments.... The whole "war system" was contrived to preserve the power and the employment of princes, statesmen, soldiers, diplomats, and armaments manufacturers, and to bind their tyranny ever more firmly upon the necks of the people.
limit the role of government in domestic life. To prevent war, societies therefore need mechanisms to monitor and punish their government's effort to utilize foreign policy for domestic political gain.7 The next step linking trade and peace focused on the domestic distributional implications of commercial policy. Behind much of the clamor for free trade in the classical literature was a strong opposition to monopolies in the domestic economy. Because tariffs tended to shield noncompetitive sectors and shift the distribution of wealth in a society toward these groups and away from consumers, the political motivation behind free trade was just as often domestic as it was international, that is, to promote peace.8 By removing tariffs and encouraging free trade, a transformation of the domestic balance of power would necessarily empower broader elements of society and simultaneously erode regulatory protection for merchants.9
The trade and that these same individuals will lobby their government to enact a peaceful foreign policy to realize these economic goals. As the political influence of the beneficiaries of commerce and trade expand in relatively equal proportion, then larger aggregate trade flows should promote peace (Domke 1988, 48) .
These mechanisms linking the economic interests of society to preferences over foreign policy decisions on war and peace need to be refined for several reasons. I have already discussed how revisions in standard trade theory illustrate that all factors or sectors in an economy do not receive income gains from trade. Consequently, economic interests can lead some societal groups to favor the closure of national markets to international trade. For example, scarce factors of production are likely to lobby for protection to reduce imports and prevent the erosion of their income (Stolper and Samuelson 1941 ). This proposition similarly implies that economic interests can lead certain groups to support any policy, including the use of military force, which reduces commerce and import penetration.'0 At the very least, protectionist interests are less likely than other groups to lobby the state for peace when conflict threatens to interrupt trade.
Sectors relying on protection may even actively support aggressive foreign policies for two reasons. First, by reducing imports and foreign competition, military conflict may create income gains for these sectors by expanding their share of domestic markets. Second, military expansion can also provide concentrated income gains to these groups by enlarging a protected domestic market through conquest and the integration of another economy. Similar to the standard arguments linking imperialist interests to conflict, an important distinction separates this claim from more traditional ones. The extent to which economic interests rely on regulatory protection from the state to remain profitable plays a critical role in their support of military force for economic expansion. Sectors that do not rely on the state for protection while surviving in international markets can generate new markets for simple efficiency reasons. Their goods penetrate new overseas markets because they are cheaper than those of international competitors. Given that the use of military conflict may carry the risk of additional costs to these sectors, they should be unlikely to support such a policy if it were to achieve the same outcome (of new overseas markets) they could achieve without the use of force. At the same time, sectors that are less competitive in international markets may be more willing to risk recovering any costs of war in new markets that they otherwise could not acquire without the use of force." These possibilities demand that any 10. Military conflict can reduce commerce for a number of reasons. Normal shipping lanes can be shut down or become subject to attack, thereby increasing transportation and insurance costs. Governments may impose sanctions or blockade enemy trading partners. For a study showing that militarized disputes reduce trade between countries, see Gowa and Mansfield (forthcoming).
11. The links here between protectionist groups and support for military conflict differ from that of Schneider and Schulze (2003) , who argue that import-competing industries prefer lower levels of military hostilities under times of increasing economic integration. They note that import-competing sectors face two costs from military conflict. The first comes from higher taxes imposed for military outlays necessary to defend the state from greater external threats. The second flows from a decline in production due to the destruction of industrial infrastructure, a reduction in imported inputs, and more costly supply routes (p. 109). I think three factors account for my different hypothesis. First, by focusing on the demand for new public revenues created by interstate hostilities, they overlook the state's capacity to distribute these taxation burdens away from some groups. For states that fund a large portion of their public revenues from tariffs, it is claim that commerce reduces military conflict must account for the relative political strength or veto capacity of societal groups unlikely to support liberal commercial policies and peace for economic reasons.12 Apart from understanding the role of protectionist interests in decisions to use military force, one must also examine the influence of their societal opponents-those favoring peace for economic reasons-in this domestic struggle. The primary beneficiaries of free trade face significant organizational hurdles in their lobbying efforts pursuing both free trade and peace. Studies of the domestic politics of commercial policy (e.g., Alt and Gilligan 1994) illustrate that gains from trade, whether in the form of reduced prices for consumer goods or new export markets, are often diffused throughout society. This diffusion reduces the willingness of these groups to undertake costly lobbying activity for the relatively small benefits of greater openness to trade. At the same time, the costs of economic integration, whether in the form of factory closures or job losses, are often more concentrated in specific industries or firms. Organizational advantages thus help those groups most hurt by international trade to overcome the collective action problem and mobilize support for protective policies that insulate their sectors from international competition.
Similar organizational difficulties may reduce the effectiveness of societal constraints on a government's efforts to use military force as an instrument of foreign policy (Gowa 1999 ). The aggregate benefits that stem from avoiding the costs of war may be spread evenly across society to prevent individuals from undertaking the costly lobbying activity necessary to restrain a government from using force. These twin possibilities suggest that the income gains from trade may not always provide sufficient incentives to prevent conflict if their beneficiaries possess relatively weak domestic influence.
To understand the conditions when trade activates these societal interests to produce peace, we need to assess the relative political strength of these groups. Just as battlefield outcomes reduce ambiguities about the prewar balance of military power and resolve between states (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000), trade policy outcomes can indicate the relative balance of political strength between societal groups fighting a domestic battle over commercial policy. Greater levels of protection in an economy indicate that import-competing sectors have successfully lobbied the state to enact regulatory barriers and possess relatively more political influence than the beneficiaries of trade within the domestic political game. The level of protection in an economy thus provides one means to assess the relative strength of domestic economic interests in favor of war or peace. As the size of protected sectors increases, the domestic politireasonable to expect that import-competing industries will be shielded from these fiscal burdens because higher tariffs reduce imports. Cobden (1870) criticized the Corn Laws for this very reason because they created income gains for the landed aristocracy by driving up the price of grain. Second, some of the costs in declining production, such as longer supply routes, should also reduce imports and thus expand domestic market share of import-competing industries. Third, they do not incorporate the possibility that military hostilities will provide new income opportunities for some domestic producers through the conquest and integration of new markets.
12. Given findings that link democracy to peace, Weede (1995, 528-29) argues that protectionist, or rent-seeking, groups generate conflict indirectly by constraining the ability of free trade and prosperity to generate democracy. cal influence of these groups on the state and the potential for military conflict should also increase. Conversely, smaller levels of protection indicate that free trade lobbies likely to oppose military aggression possess relatively more domestic political influence.
THE STATE'S REGULATORY ROLE OVER THE ECONOMY AND CONFLICT
Although protected interests can push a society toward war to serve their own economic interests, the presence of economic regulation can also increase the potential for war by increasing the state's ability to build supportive coalitions that strengthen its domestic power. Because the state possesses a monopoly on coercion and the consequent ability to define the basic structure of property rights, and in particular monopoly rights, it can restrict entry into domestic markets and regulate the terms of exchange between buyers and sellers. This market-making function allows the state to generate tangible assets and then sell these rights to economic groups in exchange for either revenue and/or political support (Stigler 1971 ; Grossman and Helpman 1994) .
Industries that rely on protection to remain profitable are in many senses "captured" by the state and more likely to support its entire range of domestic and foreign policies. Because the right to sell goods in regulated markets is generally not transferable to another economy, it can be regarded as a specific asset (Williamson 1985) . If a firm wishes to locate to another economy, it necessarily loses this right and must repurchase it from another government. The relative bargaining position of the state vis-4'-vis these sectors increases as producers become dependent on the government for tariff protection and regulated factor markets (Levi 1988, 37) . The sale of these regulations enables the state to co-opt support for its policies, including the decision for war. As the protected sectors of the economy increase in size, a government can draw on a larger pool of society to support the use of military force against other states. In this second set of mechanisms linking protection and conflict, a governing elite, and not protected societal interests, provides the initial impetus for conflict." For example, both the French and German governments used these capacities to build coalitions in support of a more aggressive foreign policy before World War I. In France, the need for approval from the Foreign and Finance Ministries before floating the loans of foreign governments in the Paris money market allowed the government to use the economy's vast financial reserves to shape balance-of-power diplomacy in Europe (Viner 1951 ).14 In Germany, the reinstitution of a broad series of tariffs reversing the Caprivi reforms created the financial and political means to unify agricultural and industrial interests behind the policy of Weltpolitik (Berghahn 1993, 38-55) .
In summary, protection increases the likelihood of war through two complementary mechanisms. The first concentrates on how competing societal interests over eco-13. By focusing on the state's capacity to build societal support for war, this mechanism recognizes that state can go to war for any number of reasons, including purely systemic pressures. It instead concentrates on a government's capacity to build supportive coalitions so such a policy can be enacted.
14. For example, the French government used access to its capital market as a means to pressure Russia into building strategic railways in Poland in 1913 (Spring 1988; Stevenson 1996, 323-26) . It was hoped that quicker Russian mobilization would slow a German offensive into France. nomic integration may shape foreign policy decisions. As the domestic influence of protectionist interests grows, the capacity of consumers and exporters to lobby the state and produce a peaceful foreign policy declines. Moreover, protectionist interests may reduce opportunities for peace by actively supporting military expansion. Second, the sale of economic regulations enhances the state's independent capacity to build supportive coalitions for policies that may include war.
FREE TRADE AND PEACE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST
The previous section argued that the level of free trade in an economy provides the crucial link in understanding how trade promotes peace. This theoretical distinction between trade and free trade possesses important empirical implications. By often offering multiple causal mechanisms as the foundation for empirical investigations, the literature has neglected the possibility that each of these hypotheses demands separate tests for its validation. This problem is most apparent when comparing classical liberal references to "free trade" with the sociological or opportunity cost variants. By focusing on the quantity of transnational contacts, the sociological hypothesis suggests that all commerce promotes peace and that the proper specification of the independent variable is simply the total trade of a state, either with its partner in a dyad or the rest of the world. The opportunity cost hypothesis predicts instead that a measure of trade's role, relative to total national income, serves as the best operationalization for the pacifying effects of commerce. On the other hand, a focus on free trade and the size of the protected sector in the domestic economy suggests that the primary concept of interest is the state's ability to shape this commerce through such regulations as tariffs or import quotas. This section tests how two measures of protection are related to the onset of international conflict.
MEASURING PROTECTION
The quality of trade policy indicators has long been a source of controversy in the economic growth literature (e.g., Edwards 1993 Edwards , 1998 Leamer 1988; Rodrik 1995; Hiscox and Kastner 2002) . A number of measures have been suggested, including the ratio of total trade to national product, the ratio of duties to total imports, black market premiums for foreign exchange, subjective evaluations of trade policy orientation, and residuals from models predicting aggregate trade flows. Because states possess a wide variety of instruments, including tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and quality controls, to shape trade flows, measurements that rely on any one of these tools may poorly reflect the aggregate level of regulation. Moreover, protection is often industry specific, complicating efforts to create a measure of protection for an entire economy. Given these problems and the number of trade policy indicators, one recent study (Edwards 1998, 384) notes that "attempts to construct a single indicator of trade orientation may be futile" and suggests that empirical studies of the effects of openness on growth must shift to assessing the robustness of findings across multiple indicators of openness. This debate has particular relevance for empirical studies of trade and conflic because of the latter's reliance on trade intensity ratios, such as imports and export divided by GDP, to assess commercial integration. Although warning of the dangers or relying on any single indicator to assess openness, it also suggests that trade intensity ratios (such as trade divided by GDP) may be relatively poor indicators of political bar riers to trade. Leamer (1988, 147-49) notes that in traditional small country models trade is a function of resource supplies, international prices, technology, tastes, natura barriers to trade, and artificial barriers to trade. Consequently, without controlling fo all these sources, high dependence ratios (total trade divided by GDP) may simply reflect dramatically different factor endowments instead of low political barriers to trade.
To measure protection in tests of the commercial peace hypotheses, I rely on two indicators of openness. The first is the ratio of a country's customs duties to its tota imports.15 This indicator offers a number of conceptual benefits over total trade to GDP ratios. First, the depth of tariff protection provides an indicator of the quantity or free trade in an economy. As tariffs increase, the quantity of free trade should decrease Fewer goods are likely to enter an economy duty free as customs revenue constitutesa larger share of total imports. Instead of assuming that a strong negative correlatior between tariff levels and trade exists, this indicator recognizes that there are a numbel of costs captured in the price of a traded good, including input costs, transportatior costs, insurance, foreign exchange contracts, and tariffs among others. All these costs can affect the price of a traded good and consequently the size of aggregate trade flows A measure of tariffs provides one means to isolate the component of the total price ofa good that reflects government intervention.
Second, as already discussed, protection levels can measure the relative domestic strength of groups within society that benefit or are hurt by free trade. Higher barriers to trade suggest that import-competing sectors have successfully lobbied the state and purchased regulations from the government that redistribute income toward them. Or the other hand, lower barriers indicate that free trade lobbies and consumers have beer more successful in defeating protectionist interests.
Third, the inclusion of these measures also provides an opportunity to test different hypotheses within commercial liberalism. Bilateral total trade to GDP ratios, labelec DEPEND in the following tables, are normally used to operationalize such concepts as the extent of transnational ties across societies and the relative dependence of an economy on trade. Consequently, these aggregate trade ratios test the opportunity cost anc sociological variants of commercial liberalism. The inclusion of measurements for protection levels along with DEPEND in statistical tests allows me to compare the domestic version of commercial liberalism with these alternative explanations.
Despite these advantages, the use of tariffs to measure protection possesses some shortcomings that suggest using additional indicators to ensure the robustness of any To respond to these potential shortcomings, the following statistical tests also employ a second measure of protection. Leamer (1988) relatively small. In the sample using import duties as a measure of protection, the bivariate correlation with total trade to GDP ratios is -.19. In the sample using the Hiscox/Kastner indicator, the bivariate correlation is -. 14. These low correlations suggest that these different operationalizations are measuring different concepts and again underscore the need to control for protection in tests of the commercial peace.19
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test the hypothesis that greater levels of protection increase the probability of interstate conflict, I adopt standard conventions in the empirical literature on the liberal peace. The dyad-year serves as the unit of analysis in a series of statistical tests that compare how protection alters the likelihood of conflict in a year between two states. All interstate dyads in the international system provide the spatial domain of cases, whereas the temporal domain is a function of how protection is measured. When using data on import duties, the cases span from 1970 to 2000. Data utilizing the Hiscox and Kastner indicator are available from 1960 to 1992. 21. The weak-link hypothesis seems particularly applicable to tests of the commercial peace hypothesis. High protection levels in one state not only generate greater societal pressures for war, they also generate greater support for hostile policies toward it by a dyadic partner. Although protective barriers in one state prop up import-competing sectors within the domestic economy, they simultaneously can injure exporting interests in the other economy. Given this grievance, these exporters may provide a base of societal support for a government that wishes to retaliate and pursue a more aggressive foreign policy against the protectionist state. The rising tensions between Germany and Russia in the months prior to July 1914 illustrate these dynamics. The tariffs enacted to protect Prussian landowners and induce them to supporting Weltpolitik simultaneously exerted significant costs on Russian agrarian interests. Although Russia's relative land abundance suggested that it should have been exporting grain to Germany, the German government subsidized I also include two variables to control for geographic conditions that might contribute to military disputes. As states become closer to each other, they have more opportunities for interactions that can become conflictual. First, a dummy variable, CONTIGUITY, takes on a value of I when both members of a dyad are geographically contiguous by land. Second, given that the sample under investigation includes all potential dyads in the international system, many of which may have limited diplomatic interactions and consequently diminished opportunities for conflict, I include the logged distance in miles between capital cities, defined as DISTANCE, to control for this possibility. As the distance between two states increases, the likelihood of conflict between them should decrease. The results can be seen in Table 1 . The first three models utilize import duties as the operationalization for PROTECT; and the final three regressions use the Hiscox and Kastner indicator. Models 1 and 4 serve as the baseline regressions and include all the independent variables. Models 2 and 5 drop DEPENDL; and PROTECTH is dropped from the third and sixth models. With the exception of the positive and sometimes significant coefficient on ALLY, the results on the control variables conform to standard expectations across the six regressions. As the democracy score for the more weakly constrained member of the dyad increases, the probability that a new dispute breaks out between the two states decreases. The positive and significant coefficient on contiguity indicates that governments engage in more disputes against states with which they share common borders. This link between geography and conflict is further supported by the negative coefficient on distance. As distance increases, new military disputes are less likely to break out between dyadic partners. The negative sign on CAPRATIO indicates that larger power disparities between states decrease conflict. Not surprisingly, one can also see that dyads that possess at least one great power engage in more military disputes.
The dependent variable is the onset of a new militarized interstate dispute between dyad members i andj.?2 This variable, MIDON, takes on a value of I in the first year of a new dispute. Protection or openness is operationalized in two ways. Both rely on the weak-link hypothesis, which asserts that the least constrained member of a dyad drives the conflict potential of the dyad (Dixon 1993).2' With respect to protection barriers

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Given the dichotomous dependent variables
Turning to the first row of the table, one sees how free trade shapes the likelihood of military conflict within a dyad. The consistently positive and statistically significant sign on PROTECTH indicates that the probability of a new military dispute increases as the level of protection increases. Conversely, the likelihood of military conflict within a dyad decreases as the level of free trade increases (that is, protection decreases). More important, as shown by models 1, 2, 4, and 5, these results hold across both operationalizations of trade barriers. Given the hypothesized role played by protection levels in understanding how societal interests and institutions mediate between the pressures of globalization and foreign policy, these results directly support the domestic version of commercial liberalism presented here.
Moreover, if one turns to the coefficient on DEPENDL, one can compare this domestic explanation with more standard ones in the literature. Because DEPENDL has been offered as an indicator both of the degree of mutual trade dependence between states and the scope of transnational ties across societies, the negative coefficients on DEPENDL offer tentative support for these hypotheses. As pairs of states become more dependent on bilateral trade flows between them, they are less likely to engage in military conflict with each other.
If one compares models with and without PROTECTH, one sees how the omission of protection levels can alter conclusions concerning the path by which commerce generates peace. The opportunity costs and sociological variants of commercial liberalism predict that the coefficient on DEPEND should be negative and significant. As shown in models 3 and 6, these claims find support in both of the samples created by estimated by clustering on each dyad. I also estimated this model with a general estimating equation (GEE) and a random effects logit. These alternative procedures did not yield any different conclusions on the relationship between protection, aggregate trade flows, and military conflict. 2.3 x 10-*** 2.1 x 10-*** 2.4 x 10-*** 3.8 x 10-(6.9 x 10") (7.6 x 10-) (7.1 x 10-) (7. I explore this possibility in models I and 2 of Table 2 . Here I add another variable, PROTECTH x DEPENDL, to test for these interaction effects. In these regressions, the coefficient on DEPENDL illustrates its effect on the probability of a dispute when PROTECTH equals 0.27 As shown in the first model, when import tariffs are used to operationalize protection levels, the coefficient on DEPEND, is negative and statistically significant. For dyads in which neither government erects any import barriers to trade, larger trade flows reduce the probability of military conflict between two states. However, the positive and significant coefficient on PROTECTH x DEPENDL shows that these negative results will not be maintained for all values of PROTECTH. As the latter reaches higher levels, the tendency of import duties to enhance the likelihood of conflict overcomes the inhibiting role of DEPENDL. DEPENDL only remains negative and significant (p <. 10) until PROTECTH reaches a value of 4.56. For the current sample, slightly more than 9% of the total cases (7,878) meet this condition. In short, the ability of greater bilateral trade flows to reduce military conflict is restricted to dyads in which both governments have adopted free trade policies.
Moreover, aggregate trade flows do not condition the relationship between protective barriers and military conflict to the same extent. In model 1 of Table 1, Table 2 tests for these interaction effects while using the Hiscox and Kastner indicator for regulatory barriers to trade. As previously illustrated in the baseline regression, the links between aggregate trade flows and peace are again relatively weak. The coefficient on DEPENDL is negative but never achieves standard levels of statistical significance for any observed value of PROTECTH. PROTECTH is positive and statistically significant for more than 99.6% of the observed values for DEPENDL.28 Next, I would like to turn to the substantive results of these findings to underscore these differences between free trade and trade on peace. Table 3 displays the predicted probability that a new military dispute occurs between two states in a given year under four different circumstances. In the baseline examples derived from the results found in models 1 and 4 of Table 1, all the independent variables are held at their means except the primary liberal peace variables-PROTECTH, DEMOCRACYL, and DEPENDL. These values are taken at the 10th percentile for each variable to indicate "illiberal" scores, that is, dyads with large import barriers to trade, low democracy scores, and low levels of bilateral trade relative to GDP. The bottom three scores identify how the predicted probability of a new dispute changes as the value for the specified liberal peace variable goes from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile.29 Shown in the second line, a shift from a highly autarkic dyad (customs duties make up nearly 27% of total imports) to a free trading dyad (customs duties make up slightly less than 5% of total imports) decreases the likelihood of observing a new military dispute between a pair of states by more than 40%.") A similar shift in DEMOCRACY from its 10th percentile (-9) to its 90th percentile (9) decreases the likelihood of conflict by 47%. The substantive effects of DEPENDL are comparatively quite small. A shift from its 10th percentile score (0) to its 90th percentile score (0.0012) decreases the probability of conflict by only 3%.
These relative effects become even more pronounced when using the Hiscox and Kastner indicator for protection. A shift from a protectionist dyad with a score at the 10th percentile (48.37) to free-trading dyad at the 90th percentile (25.8) decreases the probability of a new dispute by nearly 70%. A comparable shift in the democracy score decreases the probability of conflict in a dyad by 30%. The effects of aggregate trade flows on conflict are relatively small, decreasing the probability of a new dispute by only 2%. Two important conclusions flow from this. First, the tendency of protective trade policies to increase military conflict is both statistically and substantively significant. Second, the level of free trade exerts a larger effect than aggregate trade flows on the outbreak of peace within a dyad.
The combination of these results strongly supports the claim that free trade enhances the prospects for peace. Although aggregate levels of international commerce are driven by price shifts that depend on many factors, including artificial barri-28. The coefficient on PROTECTH continues to increase in size but becomes statistically insignificant when DEPENDL exceeds a value of .0257. However, only 336 of 92,354 cases meet this condition. 29. A shift from the I 0th percentile to the 90th percentile demonstrates a shift from the "illiberal" to the "liberal" end of the continuum. Values for DEPEND and DEMOCRACY will thus increase as they move from the I 0th to the 90th percentiles, whereas values for PROTECT will decrease. Accordingly, the relative risks in Table 3 will all be negative because they indicate how the predicted probability of MIDON changes as a dyad becomes more liberal along three dimensions-democracy, bilateral trade flows, and trade policy.
30. These substantive meaning of these value can be made more concrete by comparing the scores of a protectionist state with a more liberal one. Before it initiated economic reforms in the early 1990s, India's lowest level of import duties in the current sample was 25.7 in 1980. From 1977 until 1993, Japan's highest level of import duties was 4.1 in 1993. Holding all other variables at their means, the replacement of India (protection score of 25.7) with Japan (protection score of 4.1) in a dyad reduces the probability of conflict from .00139 to .00084, or approximately 65%. This era may instead provide another opportunity to compare the relative strength of variants of the commercial peace hypothesis. In this case, the third-image versions (opportunity cost, efficiency, and sociological variants) and second-image arguments provide very different predictions. It is clear that the European great powers were each other's primary trading partners and thus economically dependent.3 According to the opportunity cost hypothesis, these mutual dependencies should have prevented war. The outbreak of war in 1914 thus seems to contradict these claims. On the other hand, by pointing to the rise of tariffs and economic regulations in the decades leading up to July 1914, the second-image commercial peace hypothesis discussed here would instead predict military conflict. The imposition of agricultural tariffs in Germany created an opportunity for the state to wed agricultural and industrial interests behind Weltpolitik. Whereas naval construction poisoned relations with the British, but the tariffs produced a strong anti-German coalition within Russia pressuring the government for a more aggressive foreign policy against German interests. The outbreak of war thus suggests that the variant of commercial liberalism emphasized here sheds important light on a critical case for liberal international relations theory and may help to clarify the precise mechanisms linking commerce and conflict.
